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Internationalisation and the  
Future of the School of Government 
Gary Hawke
The School of Government has achieved a good 
deal in its first five years. This includes developing a 
strategic studies programme to go beside those in public 
management and public policy, and ensuring that 
students can move among these programmes. There is 
still work to be done to get the most out of our suite 
of programmes, and one of the chief tasks of the next 
five years is to enhance the international element in our 
teaching and research.
Origins
Success has many patrons, while failure is an orphan. I 
am therefore glad that there are numerous versions of 
the origins of the School of Government.
The path that was obvious to me included a report 
which Simon Murdoch wrote when he was a visiting 
fellow at the university, and a working party in which 
I participated which was chaired by Matthew Palmer, 
the pro-vice-chancellor and dean of law. There were 
intervening steps, but while they kept alive the idea of a 
school of government they did not have a direct influence 
on the crucial decisions. Matthew Palmer, reporting to 
the then vice-chancellor, Stuart McCutcheon, managed 
the creation of the School of Government.
On several occasions I have heard state services 
commissioner Mark Prebble remark that senior public 
servants were impressed that after they had commented 
on how difficult it was to relate to the university, 
Victoria reorganised itself and provided an appropriate 
mechanism.
Mathew’s report established a mission and vision for 
the school. I have usually simplified it to something 
like ‘bringing academic expertise and knowledge to 
bear on the problems of the public sector as perceived 
by the public sector’ – I always had it in mind that we 
might assist the public sector to share our view of what 
is important, but we would rely on persuasion, not on 
any authority of our own. 
We developed the even simpler slogan, ‘building 
capability in the public sector’, which is not a matter of 
deep learning or precision but which captures the core 
of what we are about. It is because I expect international 
considerations to be more important to the capabilities 
of the future public sector that I expect it to require 
more from the School of Government.
Objectives
When I accepted the position of head of school, I 
spelt out in a letter to Matthew of 2 December 2002 
how we should understand the mission of the school. 
It included some very important points (which were 
eventually achieved):
i There will be a dedicated carpark for the head of 
the School of Government at Rutherford House 
or Old Government Buildings at a cost to me no 
more than the minimum charged elsewhere for 
reserved outdoor carparks on the Kelburn or OGB 
campuses.
ii The university will maintain Macintosh computing 
facilities for the HoS while I occupy the position.
It also spelt out some key components of what the school 
could be expected to achieve, including:
a The overall objective of the appointment is to 
develop a thriving School of Government which 
attracts a field of appointable candidates to be the 
second HoS in five years’ time.
b In elucidating the term, ‘thriving’ in para a above, 
attention will be focused not only on the ambitions 
of VUW as the university in the capital city, but 
also on the very real constraints on the investment 
which the University is able to make in the School 
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of Government. … university decisions which affect 
the income of the School of Government from 
EFTS will affect equally what is expected from the 
School.
c The vice-chancellor is committed to facilitating the 
development of the School of Government as a key 
element in the university’s strategic vision and accepts 
that this requires personal support in developing and 
maintaining relationships with the public sector and 
in assisting the School to be an effective gateway for 
the public sector to all the resources of the university. 
(I accept that we do not want a cumbersome set of 
institutions which require the vice-chancellor’s time 
and will look for appropriate streamlining.)
We achieved the overall objective of what is clause 
a above. Clauses b and c established the important 
external objective of the school: using available resources 
to make the public sector value university knowledge and 
expertise. Matthew and I were content to leave implicit 
that this was to be achieved through teaching and 
research. The university has a clear statutory objective, 
‘the advancement of knowledge, and the dissemination 
and maintenance thereof, by teaching and research’, and 
we were part of the university. Furthermore, it was the 
credibility of independent analysis that made the public 
sector want ready access to the university through a 
school of government. 
External focus
The School of Government was intended to have an 
external focus. We can claim considerable success in 
achieving it. I have written elsewhere on our successes 
and challenges in our teaching and learning programmes 
(Hawke, forthcoming), and here I want to concentrate 
on our research-related activities. These mostly relate 
to the ‘advancement of knowledge’, but the drafters of 
the university objective were clearly aware that both 
teaching and research could contribute to all of the aims 
of advancement, maintenance and dissemination, and 
that is certainly how I envisaged the activities of the 
School of Government.
The school generates a range of research. It was formed 
by bringing together an existing teaching activity with 
the Institute of Policy Studies and its satellite research 
centres. In five years we have made progress towards 
aligning the incentives and interests of the component 
parts, more slowly than some of our public sector 
stakeholders thought appropriate and more rapidly than 
some of my colleagues wished. The range will always 
include individual scholars pursuing their own interests 
and generating standard scholarly publications, whether 
or not through joint publications with other scholars 
who have similar interests. It will extend to consultancy 
on contemporary issues of management and policy 
development. The standard classifications of the Frasciati 
manual of basic, strategic and operational research are 
all appropriate for the School of Government. However, 
the school should have a particular interest in shaping 
knowledge about emerging issues that will require new 
capabilities in the public sector.
I think we were right to preserve the brand of ‘IPS’, but 
increasingly we have presented ourselves as SoG. In my 
view, we should work towards IPS being the arm of the 
school that does research of a ‘public good’ character 
– activities, including publication, which are aimed 
at public knowledge required for collective responses 
to policy questions – while the school also engages in 
consultancy, practice-based teaching which includes 
the creation and dissemination of new knowledge, and 
conventional academic research and publication.
Our major achievements include the Emerging Issues 
Programme and the VUWSoG Trust. The former 
is a research programme aimed at enhancing the 
capabilities of the school to achieve its mission, funded 
by contributions from all public sector departments 
and governed by a steering committee of departmental 
chief executives who can report to the Chief Executives 
Forum. It has generated research on the relationship 
between public servants and Parliament, on the Pacific, 
on ageing and on climate change, and more new 
knowledge on emerging issues important to the public 
sector is currently under way.
The government noticed our success in both teaching 
and research, and established a trust fund of $4 million 
to finance those aspects of the School of Government 
that are not readily provided for through conventional 
funding of university teaching and research. It gives a 
source of finance for research which does not lend itself 
to publication in academic journals, and to practice-
based teaching and learning which goes beyond what 
is funded through Vote: Education. At the same time, 
the government provided a capital endowment to 
ANZSOG, the Australia and New Zealand School of 
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Government, and trans-Tasman issues will be prominent 
in the activities funded by the VUWSoG Trust.
Internationalisation
Focusing on public sector problems as seen by the 
public sector does not imply passive, tame academics 
working to somebody else’s direction. It means accepting 
the responsibility to persuade public servants to share 
our view of the importance of some issues, and if we 
cannot succeed in such persuasion then turning our 
attention elsewhere. Within this, I think a particular 
role is persuading public servants to pay attention to 
connections that might otherwise be overlooked. I want 
to illustrate this from three examples where I have been 
working personally; other members of the School of 
Government could add many more.
Because of my role over many years in the Pacific 
Economic Co-operation Council, and through my 
participation in the Council for Security Co-operation 
in Asia Pacific, which I inherited with the School of 
Government, I have had a personal interest in Asia 
literacy and relations with Asia. When the New Zealand 
Asia Foundation was created in the early 1990s (initially 
as the Asia 2000 Foundation) the Institute of Policy 
Studies co-operated with it in several initiatives, and 
we have not moved forward as much as I would wish. 
I do not think we have built enough understanding 
of Asia into our thinking about policy developments 
and I expect this to loom large in the future work of 
the School of Government. Our teaching programmes 
must eventually be affected, but first there is research 
to be done, not so much research about Asia, but 
understanding of Asia built into research about policy 
and management. 
The recent white paper on relations with Asia (MFAT, 
2007) includes lots of sensible material, but much of 
it could have been written in the early 1990s. We can 
certainly still wish for a more learned media, but in fact 
the internet makes Asian news available to those who 
want it and New Zealand commentary on Asian affairs 
will follow when New Zealanders see its importance. We 
achieve more by creating commentary about Asia from a 
New Zealand perspective than by lamenting its absence. 
We can regret absence of Asian material from teaching 
programmes, but what are we doing to show that Asia is 
relevant to the learning in which people are interested? 
Much of the discussion is about Asian content in 
courses, but what is more important is exploration of 
how abstract learning facilitates learning about Asia, 
and how Asian thinking relates to the abstract learning 
which we value.
What most disappoints me is how little recognition of 
Asia has penetrated into additional areas of policy. An 
obvious current example is climate change, where the 
work of my colleagues under the leadership of Jonathan 
Boston has had a significant impact in policy circles. Even 
that work, however, has been Eurocentric. It assumes 
that international agreement and the Kyoto Protocol 
are synonymous. Climate change figured strongly on 
the APEC agenda in 2007, and media reporting was 
almost entirely in terms of points-scoring about John 
Howard and George Bush, including how they still had 
not signed up to the Kyoto commitments of developed 
economies. The media reflected discussion in policy 
circles; commentary missed the most significant news, 
which was not the humorous points-scoring from Hu 
Jin Tao about countries failing to meet commitments, 
but the clear assertion by Asian economies that while 
Europeans and Anglo-Saxons might like the notion of 
defined commitments and monitoring processes, Asian 
preferences are different. 
The balance between binding and voluntary 
commitments has been much discussed and experienced 
within APEC. New Zealand policy thinking should 
learn from that. All nations are selective in what they 
attach importance to. The Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty had three components: no additions to the 
existing nuclear-weapon states; disarmament by the 
nuclear-weapon states; and facilitation of access to 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. There is no 
sign that the nuclear-weapon states, including the UK, 
US and France, will pay attention to their commitment 
to reduce nuclear stockpiles and facilitate dissemination 
of nuclear technologies, no matter how much they argue 
for effective monitoring of non-proliferation. European 
Union countries rapidly found reasons not to enforce the 
sanctions of the Maastricht treaty when its provisions 
proved inconvenient. Members of the US Congress 
find nothing incongruous in proposing legislation to 
discriminate against China, in clear contravention 
of US commitments under international trade law, 
while proclaiming the sanctity of the ‘rule of law’ and 
the impossibility of changing US domestic law which 
requires trade agreements to be reciprocal. The notion 
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that Kyoto commitments will be treated as sacrosanct 
by EU members is implausible. 
Nothing in these observations justifies a cavalier attitude 
towards international commitments. They point 
towards the inadequacy of simplistic argument that 
takes a selective approach to international agreements. 
The content of international agreements is frequently 
complex and overlapping. Isolating particular provisions 
which are useful for foreclosing domestic debate about 
how international commitments should be built into 
policy design and implementation is not a desirable way 
to develop policy positions. 
As Barry Desker has argued (Desker, 2007a), Asia 
will act on climate change but will not accept Kyoto-
type commitments: ‘An approach which emphasises 
changing the norms, exerting influence on major carbon 
emitters and obtaining consensual agreements is much 
more likely to succeed.’1 Anybody who has looked at 
the history of early voluntary sector liberalisation and 
accelerated tariff liberalisation in APEC in the mid-
1990s will recognise the sense of that. It may take a 
while to develop understanding in the EU and among 
activists. But if we had made the progress in Asia literacy 
we anticipated in 1993, it would now be part of our 
policy discussion. We would not be talking about 
‘binding verifiable commitments’ versus consensual 
development of goals, but working directly on how we 
manage various kinds of agreements.2
Some old-fashioned policy analysis would help anyway. 
The design of Kyoto is very much in the interests of 
Europe, and the standard division between developed 
and developing countries is misleading. A World Bank 
study (Buys et al., 2007) defines ‘two dimensions’ of 
vulnerability to climate change: ‘impact vulnerability’ 
– weather events and sea level rises; and ‘source 
vulnerability’ – access to fossil fuels and renewable 
sources, options for sequestering emissions (including 
cessation of deforestation), and the potential size of 
employment and income shocks. Countries with high 
impact vulnerability and low source vulnerability should 
favour emission limits, and those with high source 
vulnerability and low impact vulnerability should resist 
any agreement. There is no clear pattern by level of 
development, and not much by region, although it is 
easy to see why Europe favours emission controls and 
why the US and Australia do not – dependence on coal 
is the most influential variable. 
Much local reporting on Bali used a framework of ‘most 
countries (including the EU and New Zealand)’ against 
the US, which rather overlooks the importance of Asia. 
However, it was European observers, Gwyn Prins and 
Steve Rayner of the London School of Economics and 
Oxford, who observed bluntly that ‘Kyoto was both a 
technical and a political failure’ (Prins & Rayner, 2007). 
Conventional economic analysis of cartels shows that 
Kyoto is inherently unstable. It is ironic that while 
original analysis is being done on how to manage the 
future of the WTO, an attempt is being made to build 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
into a copy of the existing WTO. An idealistic but 
forlorn yearning for solidarity is being given precedence 
over rational policy analysis.
The address at Bali of Lee Hsien Loong, prime 
minister of Singapore, was much more significant 
than recognised in New Zealand and by much of 
the international media. Lee called for an agreement 
that covers all developing and developed countries, 
acknowledges the importance of economic growth 
and respects the different situations of individual 
countries. He put a lot of emphasis on adaptation and 
technology development – and it is surely not difficult 
to predict that any international agreement will have to 
be some combination of American faith in technology 
and European insistence on emissions controls. Any 
agreement that covers all developing and developed 
countries will have to respect different circumstances 
in a manner which is much more subtle than the 
dichotomy of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’.
The climate change debate needs some Asian 
pragmatism. There are uncertainties about the 
relationship between warming and carbon dioxide 
emissions, but policy should proceed on the basis 
1 See also RSIS Commentary 95/2007 (7 September 2007) were he 
adds: ‘However, the Kyoto approach of prescriptive, legally binding 
obligations will be resisted in East Asia. …This is where an APEC 
initiative could be effective as it would mark a move away from the 
Kyoto model and bring on board China, Indonesia as well as the 
United States.’ Barry Desker is a former Singaporean ambassador 
to Indonesia who heads the Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies at Nanyang Technical University. He should be better known 
than he is to a wide range of policy analysts in Wellington.
2 Thomas Fuller and Andrew Revkin in the New York Times, 16 
December 2007, reported that at Bali ‘China and other emerging 
powers did inch forward, agreeing for the first time to seek ways to 
make ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ emissions cuts.’ That 
is consistent with how APEC individual action plans and collective 
action plans have evolved in APEC and is a long way from the 
rhetoric of many NGOs.
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that human activity is changing the atmosphere 
undesirably. There is justification for scepticism about 
‘tipping point’ arguments which are used to generate a 
sense of urgency, but sober analysis may point to the 
desirability of early action. That is essentially an issue 
of cost-benefit analysis, in which the difficulties are 
only how to deal with very long-range but irreversible 
changes, difficulties which require new thought and 
are not helped by vehement assertion. 
A major contribution to our policy debate is likely to 
come from across the Tasman. Professor Ross Garnaut 
is currently reviewing climate change policy for the new 
Australian government. He is a long-time student of 
Australia’s relations with Asia, a former ambassador to 
China, and an academic and business economist who is 
endowed with deep participant and reflective knowledge 
of how APEC has developed. The review has its own 
website (www.garnautreview.gov.au), which already 
contains a good deal of material, including a paper by 
Garnaut which was discussed at PAFTAD (the Pacific 
Trade and Development Forum) in December. Like 
the analysis of Warwick McKibben,3 it identifies the 
need for various responses with co-ordination among 
them, rather than persisting with attempting to create 
a single cartel which is inherently unstable.4 More 
interestingly, the Garnaut paper advocates equal per 
capita emissions as the solution to how an international 
climate change agreement can eventually be constructed. 
It must be a long-term objective, since it is clearly not 
feasible to eliminate immediately or even quickly the 
very wide difference in energy usage between rich and 
poor countries, but it starts to define a path which 
accommodates economic growth and which deals with 
differences among nations while having consensus on 
an international effort. One of the primary conceptions 
of APEC was that it should reconcile Asian modes of 
agreement with American demands for reciprocity; the 
international trading system still requires knowledge 
and analysis that shows that reciprocity is not needed, 
and climate change is going to be another area of 
international negotiations where this issue will be 
explored. Big powers are not going to give up reciprocity 
in a hurry, and the outlook is for a long period of 
continual discussion rather than completion of a single 
agreement. The School of Government should be 
preparing the analysts who will manage New Zealand’s 
participation.
Retirement income 
Climate change is not the only policy area where we 
need more attention to the international dimension, 
especially that of Asia. Our retirement income policy 
debate is not unnaturally much occupied with local 
questions. We will continue to explore the impact of 
tax incentives on aggregate savings (as distinct from 
the effectiveness of tax incentives in directing funds to 
favoured vehicles). We will also explore the consequences 
of demographic change, not in the popular terms of what 
can be afforded, but in recognising that conventional 
retirement ‘ages’ have been overtaken by changes in 
longevity (cf Retirement Commission, 2007). 
However, we should expect the key issues to lie elsewhere, 
partly in domestic issues and partly in international 
ones. The common thread is diversity, and the School of 
Government and Institute of Policy Studies have made 
significant contributions to its elucidation (Boston, 
Callister & Wolf, 2006; Boston & Davey, 2006). Policy 
consideration of diversity is sometimes limited to ethnic 
and gender diversity, and even to the delivery of social 
services in ways that are congenial to distinctive ethnic 
and gender groups. Retirement income policy is affected 
more fundamentally by different values and preferences. 
Government policy was once widely thought of as 
aiming to relieve poverty among the aged. It is now most 
commonly thought of as ensuring that the aged have a 
standard of living commensurate with that of society as a 
whole. However, demographic trends are requiring that 
it be conceived as facilitating choices about the extent 
to which income earned during years of employment 
is deferred to support consumption in a lengthy period 
of activity, with lower income-earning capacity beyond 
a standard career followed by years among the ‘older 
retired’. The government is more like a piggy bank than a 
welfare agency (Barr, 2001). Individual experiences will 
vary, especially through differential health status, the 
extent to which lifetime careers provide opportunities 
for post-retirement income-earning, and different 
preferences about enjoying income as it is earned or 
3 Conveniently summarised in his presentation to the PECC general 
meeting in Sydney in mid-2007 and available on www.anu.edu.au.
4 The McKibben analysis also deals with the hollow argument about 
trading system versus carbon tax. We need a trading system for 
the long term and taxes to give assurance about costs in the short 
term. The policy design issue is not to choose between them, but 
to build institutions and processes which ensure their compatibility 
over time.
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5 Preferences will themselves be influenced by social, ethnic and 
other groupings; they are not entirely autonomous.
preparing for delayed gratification.5 Policy will have to 
cope with diversity. The thought, which is valued by 
many, that we should aim for equality among the retired 
will be in conflict with recognition of diversity. That is 
the most important domestic influence on retirement 
income policy for which we should be preparing our 
graduates.
Some of the international elements are obvious. 
Migration can affect the speed of the most significant 
underlying demographic change, although its influence 
is small relative to fertility trends. Migration will 
greatly affect where and how individuals build up 
entitlements to post-employment income. As we move 
from migration being mostly a permanent move from 
one country to another, to periodic relocation in the 
course of employment, and to building families across 
international borders, retirement income policy will 
have to adapt. Some international elements are even less 
obvious. The retirement incomes of the future depend 
above all on the productivity of the future economy – 
funds build up entitlements to share in what is produced 
in the future rather than create stores of future income. 
The effective future productivity can be enhanced by 
investing in countries with younger populations (and 
so a higher ratio of producers to total population). 
Our long-held convention of fostering investment 
which generates current domestic employment will 
become increasingly in conflict with retirement income 
policy. Furthermore, we will have a direct interest 
in productivity trends elsewhere. It is not fanciful to 
contemplate that the most important decisions for the 
future of our retirement income policy may be those of 
the Chinese government about how China participates 
in international capital markets.
Education policy
Education policy has engaged the attention of several 
in the school. I have been concerned with some 
responses to the travails of NCEA and the Scholarship 
exam, while others, especially Jonathan Boston, 
have looked at issues such as the Performance-Based 
Research Fund. But as with retirement income policy, 
we should try to look beyond such issues, important 
though they are, and isolate what is the underlying 
trend which will generate future emerging issues. 
In my view, this remains acceptance that ‘lifetime 
education for all’ is an enduring response to the way 
that modern societies, economies and political systems 
require greater cognitive abilities in the population as a 
whole than used to be the case, so that an appropriate 
education system now has to be built on recognition of 
achievement and not on sorting out an elite to benefit 
from further education. There is a large degree of 
agreement in principle to this conclusion, but it often 
dissipates when it comes into tension with conventional 
and familiar processes within teaching institutions. The 
School of Government has not been entirely free from 
nostalgia for the days when ‘standards’ were adequately 
monitored by the performance of top-performing 
students, and sufficiently protected by imposing 
demanding failure rates. Other parts of the university, 
and some other parts of the education sector, are much 
further behind required attitudinal changes.
Even the School of Government is inclined to retreat 
too readily towards thinking of itself as a provider of 
knowledge rather than a provider of opportunities for 
students to develop knowledge.
The next step is to dump our most natural 
and mistaken metaphor – education as the 
filling of empty minds – and recognize that 
we learn by extrapolating, testing, modifying 
and recombining mental models of the world. 
(Saleton, 2007)
The relevant ‘mental models’ are not only those we 
inherit from the European tradition, or which originate 
in the contemporary academic world led from the United 
States in which we most frequently participate. We want 
to be equipped to engage with Asian thinking too. In 
education policy, the most obvious manifestation of this 
is the significance of realising that the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment was not a universal experience, and that 
relative valuations of freedom and order can vary. More 
prosaically, we can learn from Asian experience about the 
optimal balance between encouraging teacher initiative 
and using centralised lesson-preparation and directed 
delivery through specialised teachers. In the wider 
policy fields discussed above, we should ensure that our 
education programmes equip graduates to understand 
the different implications of Chinese ideas of ‘harmony’, 
whether between economies or between governments and 
citizens. This should be the objective of Asia literacy, and 
it is a long way from encouraging the teaching of Asian 
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languages for utilitarian purposes like trade promotion, 
although learning Asian languages can be a suitable 
vehicle for the understanding which we seek.
Conclusion
I have structured this discussion around issues which 
have been among my chief interests in the last five 
years. Because I have been in a good position to 
watch the work of colleagues, I could easily use other 
examples, notably relations between New Zealand and 
the Pacific, the growth of e-Government, and trends in 
public management. The common thread is the role of 
academic ideas in making connections between what 
may be left separate, in recognising the challenge of 
new initiatives to deeply-held inherited ideas, and in 
showing the implications of what looks attractive until 
it is really understood. 
What the School of Government has learned in its first 
five years – perhaps not entirely, but to a large extent – 
is that we are not the fount of knowledge, but we can 
provide opportunities for public servants to come together 
with academics, share their experiences and learn together, 
creating, disseminating and maintaining knowledge. We 
thus promote the strategic developments which public 
servants will have to manage in the future. 
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